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Analysing the risks of individual and collective intentionality
J.S. Busbya* and S.A. Bennettb
aDepartment of Management Science, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK; bCivil Safety and
Security Unit (CSSU), University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
The risk assessment of complex systems often seems to neglect the way in which
intentions, collective and individual, are central to our explanations of how risk
arises in such systems. Contradictions among the intentions of different actors,
for example, are typically an important part of our understanding of how
organizations break down. Moreover, risk assessment practice pays little
attention to the reflexive problem of how intentions for the risk assessment itself
can themselves become problematic. This study was an attempt to develop a
framework to support reasoning about intentionality, both individual and
collective, during risk assessment. The framework broadly follows a process of 1)
identifying the main social objects in a system, 2) asking what are the collective
intentions for these objects in terms of the functions that are conferred on them,
3) asking what obligations and powers these create, and 4) asking what risks of
organizational dysfunction can then arise. The approach was applied in a case
study of aviation ramp operations. Its main value is as a formative rather than a
summative kind of analysis.
Keywords: risk assessment; social context; intentionality; reflexivity
Introduction
It does not seem odd to say that what we risk, when we operate a complex system, is
very much a function of what we intend. Such a system is usually the product of an
intention to engage in some activity; its intrinsic physical hazards arise from an
intention to employ large quantities of energy, harmful material and so on; its
potential for breakdown arises from the potential of individual actors within it to
develop intentions that contradict one another. We are used to the idea, for example,
that technologists can have intentions for the way hazardous materials are handled
that are completely at odds with the intentions that the users develop – in the way
that was seen with the agricultural pesticide 2,4,5-T (Irwin 1995). We are similarly
used to the ways in which actors add patches and shortcuts to systems, both
technical and social, that contradict the intentions of its designers (for example Weir
1996; Snook 2000; Vaughan 1996). Actions like these tell us that what people intend,
whether individually or collectively, is central to our explanations of how risk gets
produced. Yet the analysis of intentionality rarely seems to be a principal part of risk
assessment.
This is perhaps explained by the way in which the complex pattern of social
agreements and collective intentions are ‘weightless’ to us, in the sense that, having
been brought up in a culture, we tend to take it for granted (Searle 1995, 4). We are
used to the idea that computationally-oriented risk analysts self-censor out of their
analyses those elements where ‘data’ are lacking (Fischhoff et al. 2006), which seems
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to mean a concentration on material properties and observable behaviours to the
exclusion of malleable, mental states like intentionality. And our methods of human
reliability analysis emphasise random variations in performance, not deliberate,
wilful action – despite its central role in events like the Chernobyl accident (Rosness
1992). The basis of such methods in a highly atomised view of individual action
(Hollnagel 1993) means that any notion of collective intentions seems to be entirely
beyond analysis.
There can also be little acknowledgement within a risk assessment of the broader
system of which the assessment process itself is a part – and the problems that arise
in the intentions of those producing and consuming risk assessments. Risk
assessment changes the world it analyses (Adams 1995), for example: once a risk
is analysed there is a different state of preparedness towards it, people may be able to
avert it completely, and at the very least there is usually some obligation to take
mitigating action. Thus, whether the intention of a risk assessment is to influence
the system under analysis or come to some summative view of the risks it produces
is important to how it is interpreted. We have also come to accept that an
assessment ‘expresses a political-ethical position, most obviously in its choice of
outcomes to predict’ (Fischhoff et al. 2006). Thus lying behind it is not just an
intention to perform a risk assessment but to perform an assessment of particular
classes of risk.
It is similarly important for the practice of risk assessment to take account of
how the intentions behind it become compromised or misread. The way in which
assessments are open to socio-political ambiguity (Klinke et al. 2006), and the
characteristic failure to identify multiple social meanings (Horlick-Jones 1998), seem
to say that the intention behind a risk assessment is to avoid, rather than engage
with, the problems of finding common understandings of a risk. The way assessment
is often conducted at the end of a detailed design or planning process, by which time
it is too late to influence the design or plan, points to an intention to make risk
assessment a token gesture rather than a substantive measure. It is often conducted
by ‘captive consultants’ who are shared by both regulators and industry (Otway
1992). It can be so contested that no actor can mobilise sufficient resources to act –
either for or against the technology in question (Renn 1992). And it can be
undermined by the ‘institutional attenuation’ of risk (Rothstein 2003) that follows
from uncertainty and fragmentation among the risk-managing organizations. We are
also now coming to understand how the intentions of risk managing institutions are
to manage the reputational risks to themselves, in a way that casts doubt on the idea
that risk assessment reflects an intention to protect society first and foremost (for
example, Power 2004; Rothstein et al. 2006). All in all, it looks inadequate for a risk
assessment process to neglect the reflexive exercise of analysing what various groups
intend the risk assessment to be for, and what puts these intentions at risk.
There are three other reasons for taking more account of intentionality in risk
assessment. The first is that it is quite normal to use intentions to make sense of
activity in complex socio-technical systems. Trying to perform an exhaustive,
bottom-up causal analysis of people taking actions in such systems looks far more
forbidding than relying on a top-down analysis of their intentions (Rasmussen 1986).
Second, we use intentions to hold people responsible. Once outcomes can be
controlled by intentional agency, they can be the subject of a normative system of
some kind (Malle, Moses, and Baldwin 2001). Whether such a normative system






























works is often fundamental to whether an organization manages, or fails to manage,
the physical hazards of the technologies it operates. Third, we use intentions as a
basis for evaluating performance. We think of human error only in relation to
intentional actions (Reason 1990), and it often seems as though our intentions, and
departures from them, are available to our consciousness in a way that the
motivation and execution of our actions may not be. So not only do we need a
concept of intention before analysing error, we also benefit from talking about




In the most general sense, intentionality is simply the property of mental states – like
beliefs and desires – of being directed toward something, but in normal usage it is
specifically about acting in a way that is purposeful, or meant (for example Malle,
Moses, and Baldwin 2001). This second idea is exemplified in Bratman’s (1987) work
on intentions as partial plans – plans for action that we cannot yet, at a particular
point, make complete. Whereas we can often hold contradictory goals and desires,
once we have intentions – as plan-like commitments to action – we have generally
got to the point of resolving any contradictions. As a result, Bratman (1987, 22)
argues that intentions control our conduct, rather than merely influence it. They
have stability or inertia and so resist reconsideration; they are inputs to further
practical reasoning, for example when we develop general intentions into more
specific ones; and they help us achieve coordination in our actions. They are often
the result of deliberation, but they do not have to be. They might be inherited from a
background of prior intentions or from policies that we develop in order to deal with
recurring circumstances (1987, 87).
It is fairly obvious how such qualities make intentions an interesting subject for
risk assessment. Their stability or inertia might create an excessive stability of
behaviour in rapidly changing environments; they might become detached in some
way from the action they are associated with (Reason 1990, 71) as they are overlaid
by other demands on actors’ cognitive resources; or they might be inherited from a
background of policies that do not happen to fit the immediate circumstances. Since
they are inputs to further reasoning, intentions also steer our perceptions.
Rasmussen (1986, 13) points out that how people perceive the functional properties
of an object depends on their intentions – and there is no particular reason why these
intentions should be shared with other relevant actors. Thus people operating
hazardous systems might see quite different possibilities for what to do with them,
compared with what had been envisaged by the designers.
Bratman (1987, 124) refers to the important role of classing acts as intentional in
holding people responsible. If, through deliberation, someone can develop an
intention it means that in some way they could have done otherwise (Pettit 2002,
257). This takes us on to an important part of both Bratman’s and Searle’s
treatments – the problem of ‘side effects’ or outcomes that are not the central subject
of an intention but a known by-product. This is often important in risk analysis
because of the way in which risk arises from people knowingly doing things that
cause risk (for instance violating rules) but without intending the outcome of a






























catastrophic failure (Reason, Parker, and Lawton 1998). Bratman (1987, 139) uses
the example of ‘strategic bomber’, who knows there is a school next to a munitions
factory target, but bombs it anyway, and compares this with a ‘terror bomber’ who
targets the school deliberately in order to terrorise the population. The quality of the
intentions in the two cases is quite different, and ultimately Bratman argues that we
cannot say the strategic bomber kills children intentionally. Such a distinction seems
important both in making actors accountable and in finding ways of avoiding their
objectionable acts.
There is a similar problem of determining what is really intentional when
outcomes are intended, and achieved, but not achieved as a result of the intention.
Searle (1983, 86) offers the example of one person ordering another to do something,
and the other replying that (s)he was about to do it anyway, but not because (s)he
was ordered to. The outcome was what the first person intended but did not arise
from the first person’s intention and – even though it was achieved – raises questions
about the efficacy of the intention. From one standpoint it appears to make no
difference whether an outcome, for example performing some safety-related act, is
performed because it is mandatory or because the performer thinks it is appropriate.
And Reason (1990, 8) regards such cases as curiosities. But our ideas about how
‘high reliability organizations’ work are very much based on practicing heedfulness
and mindfulness (Weick and Roberts 1993). Thus knowing whether people are acting
safely because they intend it, or because they merely intend to follow orders, can be
central to understanding the level of risk in an organization.
The main problem with the planning view of intention is the implication that an
intention is all in place before the action that it applies to. Thus Gibbs (2001) shows
that intentions are sometimes emergent products of social interactions. People
modify, refine and elaborate on their intentions in the course of such interactions,
and they sometimes come to such interactions without pre-specified intentions.
Gibbs even describes how, in infant learning, it is necessary for a parent to deceive
itself that the infant’s unintentional actions are intentional in order to help the infant
learn what to intend. And the principle could be extended beyond training infants:
one actor guiding or regulating another, more generally, may need to ascribe
intentions to more-or-less random actions in order to ‘correct’ such intentions. The
argument is closely parallel to the principle that plans are not so much control
structures that precede actions as discursive resources produced and used within
activity (Suchman 1987, 2003). As Ames et al. (2001) also point out, perceivers do
not ascribe intentions to actors out of detached interest, but as groundwork for
actions such as blaming, punishing and avoiding. Therefore it becomes important for
people to build socially desirable intentions into their actions in the aftermath of an
event, as well as in the lead-up to it.
The implication for risk assessment is not so much that we have to give up on the
idea of intentions as being important, but that we need to see intentions as being
instrumental both in the sense that 1) they help predict an actor’s actions because
they lead to them, and 2) they help us understand how actors feel they need to
explain themselves, which in turn helps us foresee their actions because being able to
explain themselves might underlie how they act. For example we are more likely to
see people undermining a system’s defences if they can link their actions to socially
desirable intentions, whether these intentions were genuine or specious explanations
of what lay behind such actions.































It is hard to think of many systems, of interest in a risk assessment, that involve
individuals acting in social isolation, so it becomes important to look also at the
notion of collective, shared or joint intentionality. Some accounts of collective
intention retain an emphasis on what is in the minds of individuals. Bratman’s (1992,
1993) view is that it consists of a web of individual intentions that must ‘mesh’, in the
sense of being coherent and consistent with one another. In addition, all the
individuals must aim at the efficacy of their counterparts’ intentions: ‘each agent
must treat the relevant intentions of the other as end-providing for herself’ (Bratman
1992). Searle’s (1990) treatment of collective intentions is similar to Bratman’s in
being about attitudes or states of mind that exist only in individuals. But Searle
argues that the state of mind associated with a collective intention cannot be reduced
to that found in individual intentions: it is a ‘biological primitive’. This implies,
somewhat oddly, that an individual can have a collective intention that is mistaken,
in that no-one else shares it. But this reflects, perhaps, a common observation that
individuals can act as though they were acting collectively and yet find they are doing
so alone.
The main criticism of these accounts is that they neglect social obligation and the
general context of social relations (Meijers 2003). Meijers argues that social relations
are central to having collective intentions, and such collective intentions are based on
prior agreements that have bound the participants in various ways. This binding
seems central to the operation of many social controls: work on the role of
organizational artefacts in systemic failure (Busby and Hibberd 2006) indicates that
quite often rules and norms simply fail because they lack ‘normative force’.
Whatever collective intention there is to be bound by such rules, individuals feel
insufficient obligation to uphold the intention. The issue of obligation or
commitment is also central to Velleman’s (1997) account of collective intention,
based on Gilbert’s (1990) ‘pool of wills’, where ‘each person expresses a form of
conditional commitment such that only when everyone has done similarly is anyone
committed’. Rather similarly, Tuomela (2005) proposes a ‘bulletin board view’ of
joint intentions that emerge when a set of individuals commit – in a way that is
visible to all of them – to some kind of proposed intention. Pettit and Schweikard
(2006) suggest that people, as a social species, are predisposed to having and
advertising these conditional commitments – inviting others to have similar
commitments and enter into a collective intention to do something. Our language
seems to reflect this: Gilbert (2006) argues that we see people being jointly committed
to intend doing an action as a body that is simple, or singular, when they make
statements like ‘we are walking to X’, as opposed to ‘we are both walking to X’. They
are not just coordinating their actions but creating a relationship among themselves,
such that each is obligated to the others to conform to the commitment, and they are
answerable to each other if they default on it. Tollefson (2002) similarly is in favour
of seeing collective intentions as genuine intentional states in groups, not just as
qualities of individuals in a group.
All this seems to be especially true in organizations, and we often appear to deal
with organizations as though they can have intentions in their own right. They can
own property, enter into contracts, and even be reasoned with (Pettit and
Schweikard 2006). Pettit and Schweikard’s argument for collective intentionality
in organizations is they have to adopt decision processes, like majority voting, that at






























some time will inevitably encounter inconsistencies. In resolving these inconsistencies
the group will adopt judgements that do not reflect the intentional ‘profile’ of the
majority of members, and possibly not even that of any of the individual members.
The organization is therefore a distinct agent, and has its own intentions to enact.
Tuomela (1993) in fact refers to the notion of a ‘corporate intention’ explicitly,
although this is often less an emergent product of individuals taking decisions
together and more a matter of identifying corporate intentions with the intentions of
senior officials. On the face of it this is a less sophisticated view. When looking back
at deeply flawed intentions in hazardous systems we often seem to see a distinctly
collective intention that arises from the structure of decision processes as much as the
intentions of any one official.
Intentionality and risk assessment
An important application of the idea that there can be collective intentions is that
they lie behind social objects like money, marriage, property and government (Searle
1995). These objects have functions because there is a collective intention that they
should have a particular role in a particular context. Their physical manifestations
are sometimes arbitrary, and often change over time: it is a social agreement that
confers on them the functions they have. We are not always conscious of this kind of
collective intention, but it is built in to our capacities and skills when we deal
with such social objects. And these objects are usually prominent features of the
complex socio-technical systems that we analyse in risk assessment. In the case
study we use in the next section – aviation ramp operations – social objects are
legion, ranging from contracts to rules to signage. The ‘ramp’ itself is a social object
that is only a ramp because there is a collective intention that it is a ramp: the fact
that it has a certain physical form does not alter this. Similarly, the aircraft
‘turnaround’ and the time ‘slot’ in which it is accomplished are collective intentions
as much as physically observable entities. In the next section we list some of the
incidents that have occurred in this setting, and most if not all have at their centre a
social object of this kind. We have therefore made social objects, and the collective
and individual intentions that arise in connection with them, the focus of our
approach to augmenting risk assessment. The general process we are proposing is as
follows:
1. The identification of the main social objects in a system.
2. The identification of the collective intentions for these objects in terms of the
functions that are conferred on them.
3. The identification of the obligations and powers that these functions confer
on actors in the system.
4. The identification of risks of organizational dysfunction that arise in these
obligations and powers – for example from individual intentions to meet
these obligations even when they are somehow problematic in the context,
or from individual intentions to set these obligations aside for some
contextual reason.
The outcome of this kind of analysis is inevitably less definitive than a probabilistic
assessment of physical mechanisms of breakdown and harm. This implies that its
purpose should be formative, not summative: it should be carried out to enhance the






























understanding of those carrying it out, not to provide a definitive measure of risk to
the world at large. But it is hard to imagine how a credible probabilistic assessment
of physical events like collisions could be carried out without first working through
an analysis of how actors’ intentions can lead them to jump stop signs, misinterpret
air traffic controllers’ instructions, and bypass mandatory procedures.
Case study
Ramp operations
Ramp operations are those activities concerned with the reception, preparation and
dispatch of commercial aircraft. The ramp is the air-side hard-standing on which
aircraft are parked. Activities that take place on the ramp include towing aircraft
onto, and pushing them off-stand; securing the aircraft; removing and loading
passenger bags, dry freight and animals; deplaning and emplaning passengers using
buses or jet-ways; providing transport for flight crews; removing dry and wet wastes;
refuelling; replenishment of fresh water supplies; catering; reactive (unplanned)
maintenance if it is necessary; de-icing the aircraft if it is necessary; and dispatching,
an activity that includes tasks such as preparing load sheets. Many of the tasks can
be performed concurrently and some are undertaken by a single contractor: for
example, aircraft towing, baggage and freight handling and de-icing. Although much
of a turnaround may be subcontracted by an airline or aircraft operator to a
handling agent, who can then subcontract the provision of the various services to
contractors, there is typically a requirement under regulatory guidance for all parties
to have responsibility for adequate safety arrangements. Thus service contracts
should not encourage the breach of health and safety law by specifying unreasonable
turnaround times and the different service providers should – in principle – take
account of the risks they create for each other (HSE 2000).
Ramp operations inherently involve a lot of physical activity taking place within
a confined physical space and a constrained time period. Brown (2002) states: ‘[T]he
airport ramp is a jigsaw of systems trying to function under extreme pressures ….
The problem with ramp incidents is the diversity of possible error situations/events
resulting from overlap activities’. Prill (1999) similarly says: ‘The average ramp is a
community of relationships …. Managers have to orchestrate a great deal of activity
in a small area around [an] expensive piece of equipment in a limited amount of
time’. As in most industries there is a tension between production and protection,
with some airlines requiring that aircraft be turned around in 20 minutes. Bennett
and Shaw’s (2003) study of 50 ramp workers at three UK airports found that many
admitted to not following procedures. Various reasons were given — including a
perception that workplace rules and procedures failed to take adequate account of
what it was like to work on the ramp. Workers rationalised violations in terms of the
need (as they saw it) to meet production targets. They did so in the knowledge that if
they were found out they would not be supported by their supervisors and managers.
One respondent said: ‘Everyone turns a blind eye until something goes wrong and
then whoever has done it cops for it’. Many felt that managers and industry
regulators had little understanding of the reality of ramp work, where aggressive
competition between the airlines placed a premium on performance. Aircraft were
high-cost fixed assets, making money only when carrying a payload.






























Accident rates on the ramp have been relatively high: ‘[F]or ground handling and
airport workers, accident rates exceed even those of the construction industry and the
agricultural sector’ (HSE 2000). According to HSE (2003) figures in 1992/93 the UK
airport accident rate per 1000 air transport movements (ATMs) was 0.79; by 2001/02
the rate was 1.04 per 1000 ATMs. This has led to various safety initiatives, such as the
European Regions Airline Association’s (ERA 2003) minimum safe turnaround time
(MSTAT) initiative that encourages airlines to set realistic turnaround targets. The
United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee (UKFSC) has used its house journal Focus
to draw attention to the $4 billion annual uninsured losses from ramp accidents. And
some airport groups, like Heathrow’s Airport Users’ Committee (AUC 2001), have
developed ‘best practice’ checklists for contractors in an effort to reduce accident rates
without reducing turnaround performance.
The nature of what can go wrong in ramp operations is illustrated by a number
of recent publications in the aviation trade press summarised in Table 1. We have
included in this table both minor incidents, in which there was no significant loss of
life or injury, and more major accidents, as all indicate something of the nature of
conditions the actors experience.
A sample analysis
In Table 2 we present an example of how an intentionality-based approach to risk
assessment might work in this context. It follows the principle laid out earlier of
organising the analysis around the main social objects to be found in the system. The
first column lists these objects, and the second column the functions that we would
expect to be imposed on them by collective intention. The third indicates what
obligations these intentions confer, and the fourth column indicates the risks that
follow and the intentions with which they are associated. The social objects are
grouped into major categories, more to make the process systematic rather than
reflect any theoretical distinction. Thus the first category is of ‘major structures’, like
the ramp itself and the time slot. Risks identified at this level tend to be so general as
to be vacuous. But the value of including them in the analysis is that it reminds us
that certain risks are built in by very basic commitments – such as the commitment to
the idea of co-locating all loading and unloading activity in one small space. The
second category is of ‘cultural assumptions’. It is arguable whether these constitute
social objects, and might be better described as part of Searle’s ‘Background’ against
which collective intentions and social facts operate. But the value of incorporating
them in the analysis is that they have a similar status, being collective representations
of things that determine action. For example expressions like ‘keeping the aircraft
flying’, ‘sweating the assets’ and ‘working the capital’ point to cultural elements that
can be counted as social objects insofar as there is a collective intention that they are
norms governing people’s behaviour in this setting. The third category of social
object covers ‘contracts and remits’ – essentially formal agreements about the status
of actors and how they should act. The fourth category is of ‘routine devices’ and
this includes the more numerous and more particular objects that structure activity
on the ramp – from roles and rules through to physical markings. As with any
analytical framework the structure provides a way of organizing and prompting the
use of existing knowledge about the system, rather than producing knowledge in its
own right. And this particular case study has to be seen as indicative rather than






























Table 1. Examples of materialised risk in ramp operations.
Source Specific incidents or types of incident reported
Anon. (2002). How do you
view ramp damage? Focus
on Commercial Aviation
Safety, Summer, 6.
Passenger steps collided with APU exhaust of stationary
aircraft, having been towed in unauthorised fashion
sideways not lengthways, aircraft having been stopped by
marshaller with tail extended slightly beyond yellow line
Godfrey, D. (2002).
Aircraft damaged by
de-ice rig. Ibid., 8.
De-ice rig manoeuvring from one side of aircraft to the other
was hemmed in by fuel bowser on adjacent stand and failed
to lower boom to clear tail plane wing tip, which it struck
Anon. (2002). Stand discipline:
does your organisation
have it? Ibid., 11.
Catering vehicle struck opened forward hold door after
approaching aircraft at angle, breaking rules, instead of
waiting for obstructing equipment to be removed
Anon. (2002). Helicopter
ramp incident. Ibid., 22.
Helicopter taxied away from stand crushing baggage loader
against baggage truck; crew had completed pre-taxi checks
with no ground crew in sight but had missed illuminated




Stairs were pulled away from aircraft at a remote stand before
being fully retracted, and driver turned too early in
constrained manoeuvring area, resulting in collision with
aircraft wing
Anon. (2002). Just another
ramp incident. Ibid., 29.
Steps used to service prior aircraft not removed from stand
and left with brake off; subsequent aircraft’s engine airflow
suction sufficient to draw steps towards intake and removed
part left on steps was drawn into engine
Matthews, R. (2004). Ramp
accidents and incidents
constitute a significant
safety issue. Focus on
Commercial Aviation
Safety, Winter, 4–7.
Surface vehicles striking aircraft during passenger boarding,
causing falls
Taxiing aircraft collided with employee bus as driver ran
a stop sign while crew were engaged in completing
paperwork
Crews failed to follow braking procedures on pushback
leading to severe injury
Crews failed to follow engine start procedure resulting in
excessive jet blast leading to fire at gate in which aircraft
destroyed
Tug driver failed to set parking brake before leaving tug, then
accidentally hit accelerator when returning to tug after
setting tow bar, throwing tug forward and crushing driver
against aircraft
Marshallers failing to ensure area behind or adjacent to
moving aircraft clear, failing to follow
communications procedures and failing to use proper
chocking methods




Employee struck by propeller while walking to chock right
hand landing gear after chocking nose landing gear despite
instruction to approach from rear
Official struck by helicopter blade while walking away after
checking door securely latched
Guard responsible for keeping unauthorised people away
from helicopter walked into tail rotor despite training
session on how to approach aircraft safely






























definitive because a more conscientious exercise would involve a great deal more
participation of the actors themselves.
There are some general themes that emerge in this table:
N The first is that the collective intention about an object’s function can often be
ambiguous or disputed. For example, rules are treated as mandatory and
without exception by some (typically managers and rule makers) and as
advisory by others (typically workers). This means that the collective intention
underlying a whole class of social objects – rules that supposedly embody safe
behaviour – is ambiguous or contested. A similar comment applies to what
have been labelled ‘concessions’. This is meant to refer to agreements, often
tacit, between managers and workers that rules can be violated. But this
agreement is often such that workers would nonetheless be blamed if an
accident arose as a result of the violation, and therefore becomes highly
problematic as a collective intention.
N The second theme is where a fairly clear collective intention is set aside because it
is the most negotiable of constraints in an over-constrained situation. Again,
many rules are implicated here, and so are practices like setting parking brakes
on stationary vehicles. The individual actor seems justified in setting aside the
collective intention that certain practices are always followed on the basis that
skilled performance is an individual repertoire that is learned experientially.
Thus explicit, agreed-upon practices do not become the objects of an individual
intention when the collective intention is that they should do.
N The third theme is where a social object imposes obligations that lead to
intrinsically risky behaviour. Service level agreements that are particularly
demanding – for example in terms of turnaround time – are implicated here.
The difficulty is plainly that such agreements cannot take account of all
eventualities. When actors set out to honour these agreements, and their
obligations under the collective intention that underlies them, the result can be
behaviour that is insensitive to unspecified goals or unforeseen circumstances,
and is therefore risky in those circumstances.
A sample reflexive analysis
We argued earlier that an analysis of social context should also involve an
understanding of risks to the risk assessment itself. There should be some way of
Source Specific incidents or types of incident reported
Scott, S. (2006). Airport
safety: When it comes to




Taxiing aircraft wing collided with stationary aircraft tailfin
after being given instruction to taxi to holding point beyond
that of stationary aircraft: probably wanted to depart
within slot, and probably believed that ATC approval to
proceed meant they were clear of obstacles, which it cannot
as many airport vehicles are allowed to free range; official
position also that holding points located to ensure clearance
is sufficient in front of the stationary aircraft, not at the rear
Table 1. (Continued.)






























Table 2. Sample of social objects and associated risks in ramp operations.
Object Imposed function Obligations generated Risk of organizational dysfunction
Major structures
Ramp Fixed space counts as place
for all unloading and
loading activities
Actors should coordinate
in space with multiple
other actors
Potential for collision particularly when little effort made to meet
obligations
Intentions of individual actors directed toward completing individual
actions rather than collective actions
Time slot Period counts as duration of
fixed extent at predetermined
time for all unloading and
loading activities
Actors should act so as to
avoid exceeding time
available
Potential for short cuts and individuals acting in an unsafe way particularly
when effort made to meet obligations
Intentions of individual actors directed toward meeting the collective intention





One group counts as
authority on production,






Potential for safety authorities to stipulate standards that are unachievable
given production pressures, leading to attitudes of secrecy
Intentions of separated authorities are directed towards their individual





One group counts as
responsible for directing







Potential for collapse of responsibility where the two groups transfer
responsibility for outcomes to the other
Intentions of managers typically to accept short cuts to achieve production






Aircraft counts as entity
whose time in turnaround
should be minimised







counts as being safe
Actors should comply
with rules
Potential for failure to observe unplanned contingencies following from
unthinking rule compliance and relaxation of vigilance

































































































Potential for client firms to get rid of their capacity to scrutinise
subcontractors
Intentions are to exploit the subcontracting by economising on all expenses
and efforts that are subcontracted
Service Level
Agreements
Service levels count as targets
on which lack of attainment
can be penalised
Finding objective ways of
assessing performance
against targets
Potential for stressing targets that are measurable and ignoring aspects of
performance that are important but not measurable
Intention becomes to monitor and meet targets irrespective of performance
in other respects
Remit Remit counts as limit on
authority
Limited authority should
not act beyond remit;
others should act as
though authority will
not exceed its remit
Potential for remit to be confused, anomalous or obscure leading people to
assume an authority has more power or knowledge than it in fact has
Intentions may be based on misunderstood remits and therefore fail to
incorporate essential actions
For example manoeuvring vehicles or aircraft may assume air traffic control
clearance means the route is clear of obstacles when in fact ATC’s remit
is only to assist in averting collisions in the manoeuvring area
Routine devices
Roles Roles count as expectations
of what any individual
occupying a post should do
Role holders fulfil the
associated expectations;
others support their
capacities to do so
Potential for roles to be insensitive to circumstances
Intentions are to fulfil role expectations, not recognise the role’s essential rationale
For example crew checking for unsafe conditions may expose themselves to
these conditions – such as collision and falls
For example use of banksman for manoeuvring means another individual




























































































Object Imposed function Obligations generated Risk of organizational dysfunction
Rules Rules count as constraints
on behaviour whose violation
can be censured
Individuals comply with
rules and rule makers
design rules to express
safe and reasonable
constraints
Potential for rules to require behaviours that are confounded by
circumstances, contradict prevailing pressures or counter prevailing culture
Intentions are such as to involve rule violation as a known by-product
rather than a particular goal
For example vehicle drivers violate rules for manoeuvring around aircraft to
avoid temporary obstruction under time pressure which discourages
them from waiting for obstruction to be removed
For example vehicle drivers approaching aircraft in proscribed way in order
to avoid other vehicle and avoid waiting for that vehicle to withdraw
For example moving towed or pushed object such as steps by fastest not
safest method such as sideways not lengthways
For example individuals choose not to wear personal protective equipment
because it is counter-cultural or because it interferes with free movement
or is uncomfortable
For example individuals cannot wear personal protective equipment which
is lost but not admitted because they do not want to appear incompetent
For example workers approaching to chock landing gear from front not
rear as required because it is on a shortest route round the aircraft
For example drivers operate without a banksman if an aircraft is coming on
to the stand before ground operators completely ready
For example passengers insisting on their ‘right’ to smoke, possibly in the
vicinity of refuelling
Potential for rules to require behaviours that are risk-increasing in particular
situations and thus become generally discredited and lose their moral force
Intentions come to lack any strong concern with rules
For example a vehicle is required to have a banksman as it exceeds a height
threshold yet has 360 degree vision so exposes an additional individual to
























































































Object Imposed function Obligations generated Risk of organizational dysfunction






violation to the specified
circumstance; managers
should share responsibility
if there is an unfavourable
outcome
Potential for breakdown in organizational order if the concession is
incomplete, with managers approving violation but blaming individuals
for bad outcomes
Intentions of both parties are to accommodate mutually exclusive demands
without revising the rules or goals that bring them about





Potential for competencies to be set aside when learned to be unnecessary,
yet actually needed to avert accidents
Intentions may be to rely on experientially learned skills that seem more
suited to competent behaviour than explicit practices
For example vehicle drivers failing to set parking brakes then accidentally
hitting accelerator when returning to vehicle
Standards Standards count as minimal






Potential for operation below standard when not achievable within a
demanding time slot
Intention of actors is to set aside the constraint presented by the standard if
otherwise the situation is over-constrained




























































































Object Imposed function Obligations generated Risk of organizational dysfunction
Procedures Procedures count as
mandatory sequences of





Potential for short cuts and departures generally when conditions make it
hard to follow them
Intentionofactorsmaybetofollowproceduresbut their realisation isconfounded;
strangers (for instance passengers, especially child passengers) are especially
problematic as they have no particular familiarity with particular social objects
For example tired, disoriented disembarking passengers especially infants
leaving safe areas on remote stands
For example crew unable to hold disembarking passengers on steps while
waiting for following bus
For example drivers of vehicles such as de-icing rigs not taking prescribed routes
around aircraft when obstructed by other vehicles such as fuel bowsers
For example crews fail to follow engine start procedure when they surmise it
is unnecessary resulting in excessive jet blast and fire risk
Potential for loss of vigilance because procedures have been executed successfully
Intentions may be to follow the procedure rather than achieve a more basic
outcome thus displacing any intention towards this outcome
For example vehicles move after completing checks but ignore warnings or
individuals in proximity
Potential for distraction in process of following procedures
Intentions may be to complete procedures which leads to loss of vigilance
during completion
For example crews fail to notice obstacles to taxiing while completing paperwork
Markings Markings of various kinds









Potential for boundaries to be over-stepped and not corrected under time pressure,
leading to the potential for collisions in an even further constrained space
Intentions of actors may be to avoid correcting small transgressions when
correction involves loss of time
For example collisions of vehicles and especially towed objects like steps
with parts of aircraft extending beyond boundaries
For example collisions with drivers of vehicles ‘running a stop sign’
Potential for meaning of particular markings to be misconstrued even
where legitimacy is accepted
Intentions may be to comply with markings but in fact fail to do so
For example holding points are located to ensure sufficient clearance in front of
























































































helping those performing the risk assessment reason about the system of which the
assessment is a part, preferably using the same framework as that used in analysing
the target system. In this case study, we have chosen a scenario of an airline planning
to start operations at a new destination airport, and performing a risk assessment of
its ramp operations as part of the decision about whether to use this destination. In
practice the assessment would involve a group of people in discussion with service
companies, security agencies and security firms, airport managers, caterers and so
on.
The analysis, shown in Table 3, follows the same structuring approach as the
main analysis, where the ‘way in’ to the analysis is to look at the main social objects
involved, the related functions imposed on these objects, obligations and potential
risks. The potential risks are shown slightly differently, with an indication of possible
dysfunctions, the related intentions of actors, and then some implications for how to
manage the analysis process. As with the main analysis, the concept of a ‘social
object’ is interpreted very broadly.
Again it could be argued that some of the obligations shown in the table seem so
obvious as to be not worth stating – for example the notion that risk assessors are
under an obligation to test the system owner’s claims about how the system works.
But it is worth spelling out just what is involved in the collective intention as it may
become important to examine this. It is perhaps not an uncommon experience for
technical analysts to see the collective intention behind an analysis to be to produce
new insight, whereas in fact it may be to merely confirm a predetermined view, or go
along with an institutional requirement to conduct an analysis with no particular
regard to the result. We are used to the idea of different actors having different
‘agendas’, so if we are looking for threats to a risk assessment it seems reasonable to
think about these agendas. Someone who is party to a collective intention has an
obligation of some kind to see that intention realised, and this is the case even when a
party develops individual intentions that are at odds with the collective intention. A
central aspect of risk to the risk assessment is the potential for this contradiction, and
it needs examining if the risk assessment is to get beyond the status of being a mere




Our premise was the idea that it can be more productive to look at intentions rather
than causes when examining the risk of systemic failure. In the light of the case study
it seems to us that an analysis of intentions offers five benefits in particular: 1) it
helps deal with particular kinds of organizational pathology; 2) it gives insight into
the nature of responsibility; 3) it provides empathy for the actors in a system; 4) it
provides a better vantage point more generally; and 5) it provides a better basis for
mitigating risks.
The first benefit involves the fact that what goes wrong in some failure modes is
the development and realisation of intentions, and particularly the relationship
between collective and individual intentions. These intentions fail to coordinate, or
they fail to generate sufficient obligations, or they generate excessive obligations, and
so on. Without an explicit analysis of intentionality it is hard to see how such failures






























Table 3. A reflexive analysis of the risk analysis.
Social object Status function Obligations generated Risks
System owner’s
claims
Claims count as assertions
by an interested party to
be tested in the
assessment
Claimant should furnish




Potential for fraudulent claims to be taken on face value, or for reasonable
claims to be dismissed
Intention of owners and assessors ultimately will be different and
potentially contradictory, so the collective intention that claims count as
test-able assertions may be compromised
Implication is to maintain credibility of the assessment by triangulating
data sources, and finding evidence to substantiate claims
List of risks Risks count as potential
threats to reliability or
safety that should be
understood and
managed
Actors should ensure the
list is complete as far
as is possible
Potential for incompleteness
Intention to undertake a complete analysis indicates being systematic and
widely consultative
Implication is that assessors need to ask how they know they have assessed
all relevant risks in a situation that is likely to be new to them in some way
Underlying
model or ideal
Model counts as basis on
which to make judgements
of adequacy of some
system
The model should in some
way be validated as a
basis for judgement
Potential for models to indicate misleading qualities or questions
Intention of assessors may be to act quickly, or defensibly, rather than
perform the most insightful assessment
Implication is that assessors need to ask whether – for example – the model
of a European location is appropriate for North Africa
Analysis of
system
System counts as normal
configuration that might
be expected in routine
operation
The focus of interest
should be on what is
realistic and actual
rather than what is ideal
Potential for system to be misrepresented by the owner or for the system to
be observed at an unusually favourable time
Intentions of system owners may be to present system in best possible light
(for example handling all aircraft via airbridges instead of remote stands)
Implication is that steps need to be taken to understand the normal
condition of the system, or the range of possible conditions, or put
























































































Social object Status function Obligations generated Risks
Roles of actors Roles count as
expectations of what
any individual occupying





Potential for commercial and safety groups within an organization to
disagree on the significance of a risk assessment that suggests an
operation is problematic (for example flying to a destination that poses
security risks)
Intentions of actors that follow from their role-conferred goals can
produce conflict that is legitimate but impedes concerted action
Implication is that while there is a collective intention that people
adopt certain roles they also need to set them aside in certain
instances
Expertise Expertise counts as
particular qualification





limit expectations to fit
what expertise is claimed
Potential is for the usual characteristic problems that can flow from having
an expert community: an insensitivity to what matters to others, an
inability to draw on relevant folk or craft knowledge, an inability to
have influence on public decisions, or an inability to inject the learning
that comes from risk assessment processes back into the system being
assessed
Intentions of experts may be to achieve status among fellow experts and
exacerbate the characteristic problems





























































































will be adequately considered in a risk assessment. In the case study there are various
risks of collision that are obvious from the physical nature of the ramp, but it is not
obvious how and why drivers and crew will bring such collisions about without – for
example – an analysis of individual and collective intentions towards manoeuvring
rules.
The second benefit involves the point made earlier that we analyse intentions in
order to assess responsibility. Mens rea, the intent of the offender, is typically central
to the determination of liability in Western legal systems (Edgerton 1985, 31). By
looking at the intentions that lie behind a risk we can make some assessment of
whether they will be regarded by actors in the system as reasonable or justifiable. If
they are not justifiable we might expect social pressures to minimise the chances that
the intender will carry out his or her intention. If they are justifiable we might expect
such intentions to persist and to be realised. In the case study, intentions to take
short cuts seem inevitable given the collective understanding of a ‘turnaround’ and
the importance of getting aircraft flying. It is unlikely that such intentions will be
socially suppressed.
The third benefit is based on the notion that if we think about actors in a system
in terms of their intentions, not just their causal responses, we get a better insight
into them as reasoning agents, not merely rational (or irrational) responders to
causal events (Pettit 2002, 163). This kind of empathy seems to us to be important if
the analyst needs to understand the local logics that actors are likely to follow, how
they might arrive at what they regard as being defensible actions, and how the system
of which they are a part will make sense to them. As Taylor (1987) pointed out in
connection with accident analysis, the mere behavioural analysis of accidents will
never be enough, and we must also investigate the antecedents in terms of their
meaning to the agents involved. For example, the case study points to the possibility
of actors on the ramp developing a natural intention to demonstrate competence,
and this seems likely in some cases to lead them to relying on their experiential
learning in preference to rules and procedures. Compliance with rules makes their
behaviour appear devoid of autonomy.
The fourth benefit, that an understanding of intentions gives a better vantage
point, is also an argument made by Pettit (2002, 184). He argues that intentional
explanations are inherently normative – giving us a view on what agents are
committed to do in some way. This gives us a ‘vantage point’ on the performance of
a system because we can often infer that some action will come about even when we
are not able to predict exactly how it will come about. The mere fact that it is
someone’s intention gives it a good chance of materialising. Thus, for example, we
can predict that drivers will do interesting and perhaps hazardous things in order to
fulfil an intention to achieve a minimal turnaround time. We can predict that they
will sometimes take metaphorical and literal short-cuts – even if we cannot predict
the details of these short-cuts. A risk assessment based on causation will tend to
look for the ways in which short-cuts can be taken, and relies on the cleverness of
the assessor to identify all possible short-cuts; a risk assessment based on
intentionality will tend to look for the reasons for taking short-cuts, and assume
that if there is an intention the actors will be sufficiently clever to find a way of
fulfilling that intention.
The final benefit was that intentionality contributes to finding better ways of
mitigating risks. Relying on causal analysis essentially produces models of the






























stimulus-response kind that are likely to indicate the wrong kinds of remedy. If you
are looking at rule violation as a source of risk, for instance, a causal or stimulus-
response view seems likely to indicate that you should provide incentives to increase
rule compliance, or penalties to reduce violation. But we know rule violations are
often the products of behaviour that has its own kind of rationality, and that forcing
compliance simply brings different, possibly worse consequences than violation. The
best way of finding out how to deal with rule violations is surely to understand why
people might develop intentions that involve them in violating rules. In the case
study, as in most systems, there are risks both in complying with rules and
procedures and in violating them – so a simple-minded calculus of raising the costs of
either compliance or violation looks inappropriate.
It is possible, of course, to concentrate on agency and wilfulness to the exclusion
of all else. Wisnewski (2005) reminds us that, although some intentional actions
involve much cognitive effort, in other situations ‘all reflection drops out of the
picture’. Reason, Carthey, and de Leval (2001) suggest that the ‘illusion of free will’
is one of the factors that produces an excessive, and safety-reducing, tendency to
blame people for bad outcomes. And Lu¨tzho¨ft and Dekker (2002) claim that
accident analyses tend to explain failures in terms of human motivations in the face
of evidence that people’s behaviour is shaped by their tools and tasks. What we need
to aim for then is some kind of balance between analysis that simply ignores actors’
agency and their capacity to develop intentions, on the one hand, and denies the
causal influence of context and constraint, on the other.
Collective intentions and social objects
One of the criticisms of Searle’s view that collective intentions confer particular
functions on certain objects is that it is unclear what the collective intention really
amounts to – whether it is an agreement, mere acceptance, or really something that is
imposed on a group of people (Ruben 1997). In the case of formal organizations, like
companies, it is very likely that the intentions that are attributed to the organization
have not been specifically agreed to by a majority of individuals within the
organization. However, as the basis for a method of risk analysis, the idea of what a
collective intention ‘really’ is does not need to be settled. The whole point of the
analysis is to examine what it means in particular situations. For example, two of the
accidents we listed earlier involved the role of air traffic controllers in manoeuvres on
the ground, and the differing interpretations that different actors appeared to have
of this role. It is thus useful, for the purposes of risk analysis, to ask what kind of
collective intention we are really talking about when we say that a particular object
has a particular function according to a collective intention. From the standpoint of
those theorising about social meaning the ambiguity of collective intentionality is a
problem; from the standpoint of those interested in identifying risks, it is an
opportunity.
Searle’s view on social objects is that they are not particularly primary in the
analysis of social meaning. It is social activities that come first, and social objects
follow. The ramp is an object that is the way it is because of what people do there: it
is not something that comes before what people do there. Again Ruben (1997) has a
critique. This is that some social objects do seem that way – for example money is
not much more than the pattern of activities that uses money. But there are other






























objects that seem to be more than just activity, such as complex social organizations
like a nation or a firm. This difference is again something that our approach can
benefit from, however. Objects constituted just by activity seem likely to be more
vulnerable to misuse or neglect if there is nothing more to them than the way people
regularly behave. Objects where there has to be a lot of prior design and negotiation
and institutionalisation are perhaps more likely to resist neglect. Given what is at
stake, aviation ramp operations are highly institutionalised. On the other hand,
objects constituted by activity might be more responsive to necessary change,
precisely because they do not need extensive institutional re-design. Thus the
relationship between social object and social activity is another issue where the lack
of a theoretical settlement is an opportunity rather than a threat to risk analysis.
Conclusion
The approach we have proposed – to use ideas about intentionality to identify risks
of organizational breakdown and then physical harm – looks weak by comparison
with engineering methods. The risks that are identified are not identified with much
precision, and there is no way of judging the completeness of any analysis.
Moreover, some writers on intentionality, and collective intentionality in particular
(Saaristo 2006), argue that the whole concept of intentionality is beyond empirical
verification: it provides us with a way of describing behaviour that fulfils the
conditions of intentionality largely because we believe in intentionality. It could also
be argued that, by concentrating on risks of accidental breakdown rather than
deliberate subversion, we have excluded the kind of risk in which intentionality is
most clearly seen. But it would be wrong to give up on analysing the intentions
behind accidents when they are so central to how we think about people collectively
keeping inherently hazardous systems safe. These systems and their various defences
do not arise from mere desiring: they require extensive, collective intentions. It is
problems with such intentions that often seem be the source of organizational
collapse.
Our proposal has been to concentrate the analysis on the main social objects to
be found in such systems. It follows Searle’s idea to look at the collective intention
that confers on these objects the functions they have. But it takes this as problematic
and so looks at how this collective intention could contradict the individual
intentions that actors develop, and the potential this brings for a breakdown of some
kind and the physical hazards that can follow. The advantage of this approach is not
only that it helps us understand how intentions go wrong in a hazardous system, but
also that it gives us more insight than other methods into the nature of responsibility
and how different actors deliberate in different ways.
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